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ABSTRACT 
 
Resistance to the Expansion of Pachakutiq's Inca Empire and its Effects on the Spanish 
 
Conquest. (May 2012) 
 
 
 
 
Miguel Alberto Novoa 
Department of History 
Department of Economics 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Glenn Chambers 
Department of History 
 
 
 
 
This endeavor focuses on the formation and expansion of the Inca Empire and its effects 
on western South American societies in the fifteenth century. The research examines the 
Incan cultural, economic, and administrative methods of expansion under Pachakutiq, 
the founder of the empire, and its impact on the empire’s demise in the sixteenth century. 
Mainstream historical literature attributes the fall of the Incas to immediate causes such 
as superior Spanish technology, the Inca civil war, and a devastating smallpox epidemic; 
however, little is mentioned about the causes within the society itself. An increased focus 
on the social reactions towards Inca imperialism not only expands current information 
on Andean civilization, but also enhances scholarly understanding for the abrupt end of 
the Inca Empire. This study on the Inca Empire will improve the historical analysis on 
the rise and fall of the largest empire in pre-Columbian America. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Incas were a civilization of western South America which settled the central Andes 
Mountains, in the Cuzco valley of present-day southern Peru, circa 1200 AD. This 
valley, named after the Inca’s capital of Cuzco which was founded at approximately the 
same time of their arrival in the region, originally housed a small Inca society of llama 
herders and terrace farmers.1 Overtime, the Incas expanded their control over local 
ethnic groups and structured a complex social hierarchical pyramid. Tributes linked 
ethnic groups outside the city of Cuzco to the elite, led by Incas with close genealogical 
and geographical ties to the original founders of Cuzco. Other elites, such as the nobles 
and residents of the city of Cuzco, held fewer privileges than the ruling royalty. With the 
aid of this hierarchy, the Incas attained regional domination by the fifteenth century.2 In 
1438, nobles and military officials seeking to obtain greater political power helped 
Pachakutiq, the youngest son of king Wiraqocha, become ruler after he defeated his 
brother in combat and repelled the invasion of the Chanka, a rival Andean civilization 
west of Cuzco.3 Pachakutiq’s accession to the throne marked the beginning of a massive 
Inca imperial expansion over western South America. 
Through warfare and diplomacy, the Incas incorporated into their empire civilizations 
such as the Huanca and Huarochiri. The Huanca, a powerful society of dog-worshippers 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of the Latin American Research Review. 
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from the central Peruvian Andes who prided their independence and terrorized nearby 
polities with cruel military tactics, fell to the Inca army in 1460. According to María 
Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, a Peruvian historian of ancient Andean civilizations, the 
Incas used methods of “lightning conquests” to rapidly expand their empire. This tactic 
focused on quick battlefield victories and the creation of reciprocal agreements with the 
conquered peoples, and nothing else was done to establish authority before carrying out 
the next expedition.4 On the other hand, when the advancing Inca army met with friendly 
groups like the people of Huarochiri, a prosperous farming society neighboring the 
Huancas, the Incas formed a peaceful long-lasting alliance.5 Anthropologist Terence 
D’Altroy, an American researcher and expert of Inca archaeology, explains that the start 
of the Incan expansion was fueled from a variety of sources, including the personal 
determination of an ambitious leader and an efficient group of military officials.6 By the 
sixteenth century, the Inca Empire was the largest state in pre-Columbian America. 
However, varying degrees of resistance and insurrections doomed Pachakutiq's efforts of 
imperial unification. Rostworowski states that even though two great battles quickly 
ended the Huanca resistance, the “lightning conquests” not always succeeded. For 
example, the Guarco, an aggressive chiefdom of fishermen from the Pacific coast of 
Peru,7 made an organized effort through the use of their extensive fortifications to 
fiercely resist the Incas for several years.8 Once conquered, civilizations angry with their 
new overlords took whatever opportunities they found to rebel. The French economist 
and historian Louis Baudin describes one such uprising which took place in the 
Altiplano, a plateau encompassing areas of present-day Bolivia and southern Peru. 
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According to Baudin, the Collas, a pastoral and farming group of tribes south of Cuzco 
near Lake Titicaca, took advantage of Inca political infighting and geographic distance to 
unsuccessfully rebel against Pachakutiq.9 By 1532, during the reign of Pachakutiq’s 
great-grandson Atawallpa, a Spanish expeditionary force led by Francisco Pizarro took 
advantage of continuing insurrections to defeat the Inca Empire. 
The following thesis argues that Pachakutiq’s futile attempts at unifying his empire 
through increased administrative, economic, and cultural control ultimately allowed the 
Spaniards to ally with local insurgents in order to conquer the Inca Empire. 
This thesis begins with a description of the methods used to obtain and evaluate the 
sources used in this research. The following chapter analyses the impact of the Wari and 
Tiwanaku civilizations in the development of western South American civilizations 
around the twelfth century AD. The fourth chapter focuses on the different reasons the 
Inca expansion took place during this time period and the various methods of diplomacy 
and warfare the Incas used to achieve their goals. In the next chapter, the thesis covers 
Pachakutiq's different efforts at unifying the numerous societies within the Inca Empire 
by minimizing local independence through increasing government regulation in social, 
administrative, and economic spheres. The last two chapters prior to the summary and 
conclusions deal with the consequences of the Inca's actions. Chapter eight describes the 
constant resistance and revolts of civilizations which desired independence over Inca 
authority. Chapter nine explains how the Spaniards used the Inca Empire's lack of 
unification to their advantage and, with the aid of native peoples, defeated the Incas. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
Researching a subject concerning pre-Columbian western South American civilizations 
raises a series of constraints for the acquisition of historical information. One of the first 
problematic factors in the study of Andean history, as mentioned by Swiss archaeologist 
Frederic Engel, is the lack of writing. Engel argues that, due to the lack of written texts, 
“the basic material for the historians of the pre-Columbian past” falls on archaeological 
studies and discoveries.10 Nonetheless, archaeologists face an equally difficult position 
in their research. For instance, despite the existence of iconography, which is found on 
ceramic and textile designs, archaeologist Ran Boytner explains that “much is still 
missing from our understanding of the embedded messages” as the elements presented in 
the icons were probably meant for mnemonic usage.11 Of course, material does exist 
which provides some information on the history of pre-Columbian cultures. 
Yet, this brings up another challenging matter with regards to the existing sources’ 
reliability. One of them, the quipu, a recording device which used a system of strings and 
knots, was used by the Incas and other Andean civilizations to record a variety of topics 
including statistics, legislations, and history. However, according to Peruvian historian 
Raúl Porras Barrenechea, the historical record provided by the quipus is incomplete as a 
result of two major burnings: the first committed by Inca generals at the “great archives 
of Cuzco” and the second by the Spaniards due to “the enchantments and witchcraft 
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attributed to them.”12 Another significant issue concerns the bias of chroniclers, people 
who recollected primary accounts from personal interviews. One such chronicler 
important to this research is “El Inca” Garcilaso de la Vega, the Peruvian son of a 
Spanish captain and an Inca noblewoman who spent most of his life living in Spain. 
Garcilaso openly denounced the bias in the accounts recollected by Spaniards. Still, 
albeit his information is considered “authoritative from the perspective of Incan events,” 
historian Hollis Micheal Tarver notes that Garcilaso de la Vega was also guilty of bias. A 
few of Garcilaso’s errors, as identified by social scientist Maruja Barrig, include his 
portrayal of the Incas as benevolent conquerors whom “did not repress the peoples [they] 
conquered,” his disdain towards the development of pre-Inca societies, and his dismissal 
of internal rebellions.13 Hence, when conducting a historical analysis of these sources, 
researchers hold a talk complicated by the lack of completely reliable information. 
These issues for the most part did not directly affect the development of this thesis, but it 
did have an indirect effect on the amount and type of information used throughout the 
research. For example, most of the pre-Inca analysis revolves around the work of 
anthropologists, and historians only start to play a greater role in this project once the 
research enters the realm of the Inca Empire. In the case of direct effects, due to location 
restrictions, the only primary sources available to the research came from chroniclers 
whom, as already mentioned, held a bias in their writing. As such, given the variety of 
sources detailing a specific part of the historical events, not one single author holds a 
dominant influence on this research.   
6 
 
The following sections detail the methods used in this project to gather and analyze 
sources, including the instruments used to achieve a successful investigation. 
 
Materials 
Since the research took place within the United States, gathering primary sources from 
Andean peoples or South American libraries was not possible. However, plenty of other 
resources were available including Evans Library at Texas A&M University in College 
Station, and Internet websites such as Google Books and Sabin Americana. All of the 
sources used in this research were primarily obtained through these academic resources. 
 
Procedures and approach 
The first step taken in the development of this thesis was the structuring of the argument. 
Once a tentative outline was set-up, the research aimed at justifying each premise so as 
to validate the conclusion. Typically, the usage of keywords was essential for the Internet 
searches which would lead to texts with the information. These texts would be carefully 
reviewed for reliability by researching the authors and comparing their arguments with 
other available literature on the subject. At times the sources provided different points of 
view on controversial subjects, and the approach taken during these cases was to 
investigate the controversy itself. In an effort to maintain objectivity, conflicting points 
of view are presented as such. Minor, outdated, or discredited points of view are not 
presented in this thesis. As more information became available to this research, the 
structure and conclusion both changed based on the sources. 
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CHAPTER III 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Prior to the formation of the Inca Empire, the civilizations which held imperial 
prominence in western South America were the Wari and Tiwanaku. According to 
Gordon McEwan, an archaeologist of ancient Andean civilizations, the Tiwanaku 
Empire rose out of a small farming settlement in the Altiplano which was originally 
colonized around the tenth century BC. Despite the high altitude, the region held enough 
grass for the pasturing of llamas and the growth of crops such as potatoes and quinoa, 
and the nearby Lake Titicaca provided fish and waterfowl. McEwan argues that, starting 
from 100 AD, the Tiwanaku transformed their settlement into a regionally-powerful 
capital city, evidenced by the construction of monumental stone structures such as 
temples and protective walls.14 A series of reasons justify this shift in Tiwanaku’s 
development, with the most relevant, as identified by anthropologist John Janusek, 
including changing trade networks and new political alliances. Janusek, whose research 
focuses on ancient Andean state development, explains that “Tiwanaku emerged as an 
incorporative phenomenon grounded in ideals of tolerance, diversity, consent, and 
reciprocity.”15 This mixture of ideas in turn made Tiwanaku an important cultural center 
where religious rituals and activities politically unified its diverse society. By 400, the 
former farming settlement stood as a strong theocratic state of vast imperial domains.16 
At around the same time, just north of Tiwanaku’s borders, the Wari Empire flourished. 
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Similar to Tiwanaku, the Wari civilization originated as a small community to eventually 
become a powerful empire. Inhabited circa 200 BC, Wari could have originally been a 
colony of Tiwanaku, but consensus currently aligns with Wari’s origin as independent of 
Tiwanaku. Gordon McEwan and William Isbell, a researcher of prehistoric complex 
societies in Peru and Bolivia, are among those who contend no Tiwanaku colony existed 
at Wari. They base their claim on the lack of substantial Tiwanaku influence in Wari 
aesthetic elements such as decorative stone heads, stonework cuts, and masonry styles.17 
Nonetheless, as stated by historians Cheryl Martin and Mark Wasserman, evidence 
suggests “significant cultural contact” did exist between both Andean empires. Of 
particular interest is the similarity in Wari and Tiwanaku religious iconography which, 
according to art historian and archaeologist Margaret Young-Sánchez, experts debate as 
to whether it demonstrates the existence of a common cultural ancestor or Tiwanaku’s 
religious influence over Wari culture.18 Ultimately, as Wari rapidly increased in size and 
power since 500 AD, its interactions with Tiwanaku continued in border regions such as 
the Moquegua Valley of southern Peru where Tiwanaku and Wari settlers peacefully 
coexisted. Wari’s imperial acquisitions of vassals and territorial annexations increased its 
regional strength. As indicated by McEwan, to administer their vast terrain, the Wari 
used a complex system based on location, resources, population, and previous political 
organizations, to aid them determine how much power to exert on their conquered 
domains.19 At the end of the first millennia AD, Wari and Tiwanaku stood as the sole 
dominant states of western South America.  
An analysis of the Wari and Tiwanaku interaction in the Cuzco region and the rise of 
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new powerful states as a result of their decline in 1100 AD improve the understanding of 
the Inca’s development as an entity with imperial aspirations. 
 
Cuzco under Wari and Tiwanaku 
The Cuzco Valley, located within the Wari and Tiwanaku spheres of influence, served as 
a center of interaction between these two empires, but it was the Wari that took an active 
role in the region. According to anthropological archaeologist Brian Bauer, when the 
Wari first arrived into the scene at Cuzco circa 600 AD, the region was not much distinct 
from neighboring zones. Organized societies included scattered villages and chiefdoms 
with a small number of powerful elites. Maize farming was the primary economic output 
of the region, but the level of local social interaction and development stood below that 
of the Ayacucho region of the Wari. However, the region’s diverse climate made Cuzco 
special from other places, and Bauer claims that the Wari desired to acquire it in order to 
benefit from its potentially massive agricultural output. Moreover, the region was 
extremely close to the heartland of the Tiwanaku Empire which, as maintained by 
anthropologist Charles Stanish, did not colonize the area but rather focused on trading 
their materials with the locals and even influenced local pottery styles.20 Nevertheless, 
this seemingly perfect location had one problem, as the Wari Empire soon discovered, 
and that was the population’s resilience to remain independent at all costs.  
Since their arrival in the Cuzco region, the Wari served the role of a catalyst for change 
by improving land development and increasing the region’s economic exchange with its 
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neighbors. For nearly 300 years the Wari Empire attempted to incorporate the Cuzco 
region within their empire. The Wari increased Cuzco’s agricultural output through the 
building of canals and terrace farms, and even turned previously unused lands into 
centers of agricultural production. It was also during this time that the Wari built the 
administrative fortress of Pikillacta, described by Bauer as an “architectural marvel” and 
“enormous on any scale.”21 Meanwhile, the Tiwanaku Empire took the Wari expansion 
as an opportunity to expand its own trade network with Cuzco and other border areas. 
Economist Edward Barbier explains that the “Wari-Tiwanaku trading network stimulated 
the development of many smaller trading centers throughout the Central Andes,” and the 
Cuzco region became “the secondary core trading center” behind the ones located in the 
capitals of these two empires.22 Nevertheless, despite all of these improvements provided 
by the Wari Empire, the inhabitants of Cuzco never fully accepted them as their rulers. 
Even after three centuries, the population of Cuzco continued to see the Wari as 
foreigners. The Wari initially managed to reach an understanding with the local elites 
through which they retained partial control of their territories, but overtime the 
relationship changed. Brian Bauer claims that the construction of Pikillacta was part of 
Wari’s plan to attain total control of the southern highlands. In Bauer’s view, the final 
blow on Wari’s failed efforts of control was a fire that destroyed much of Pikillacta, 
effectively forcing the Wari to abandon their efforts of expansion into Cuzco by 900.23 
Figure 1 shows the furthest extent of Wari-Tiwanaku influences and their overlap, 
mostly Wari-administered territory with influences from Tiwanaku. The overlap includes 
places such as Moquegua and Cuzco, where the Inca civilization formed in later years. 
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                        Figure 1. Map of Wari and Tiwanaku civilizations.24 
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Fall of Wari and Tiwanaku 
As a result of internal and external problems, the mighty Wari and Tiwanaku imperial 
prominence declined simultaneously and at an accelerated rate. Gordon McEwan argues 
that the Wari Empire “suffered from severe overcentralization,” and he bases his claim 
on the large ethnic diversity within the empire’s borders and the overextended size of the 
capital. These issues diminished the effectiveness of imperial administration and 
maintenance. According to McEwan, by the first hundred years of the second 
millennium the Wari’s capital was “the largest city in pre-Columbian South America,” 
causing the necessity of ever-growing amounts of food to sustain the city.25 Tiwanaku 
faced social and administrative problems as well, but their situation resulted from a long 
process of debilitation.  As indicated by Brian Bauer and Charles Stanish, years of 
political infighting and the rupturing of vast trade networks caused the overtime 
disintegration of Tiwanaku’s influence in western South America. Rebellions and foreign 
invasions further plagued the final days of Tiwanaku.26 However, the final blow against 
these empires came in the form of cataclysmic climatic changes. 
In the Andean highlands, a long drought destroyed the Tiwanaku and Wari agricultural 
systems which sustained their city populations. Engineer Charles Ortloff contends that 
“the fate of Tiwanaku was tied to raised field systems” and that its decline “was 
inevitable due to limitations on its agricultural strategy suitable to highland zones.” 
Similarly, Ortloff explains that the Wari “rainfall-supplied terraces diminished due to the 
high vulnerability of these systems to drought.” 27 Essentially, the Wari and Tiwanaku 
empires ran out of food, and by 1100 both empires ceased to exist. 
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Restructure of western South America 
The fall of Wari and Tiwanaku accelerated the ethnic and political diversification process 
present in western South America since the eleventh century. The region came under the 
control of small polities that engaged in trade and warfare.28 Out of these new states two 
civilizations achieved a dominant status over the former Wari and Tiwanaku regions, the 
Chimor of northern Peru and the Aymara of the Altiplano. 
The Aymara peoples gained control over the Altiplano region starting from the twelfth 
century, and formed small kingdoms throughout the Andean plateau. They focused on 
farming and pastoral herding, and had simple government structures. Several heavily-
fortified pucaras, hill forts, found in the area indicate their constant fighting.29 
Meanwhile, at approximately the same time the Aymara rose to power, Wari’s coastal 
domains in northern Peru came under control of the Chimor kingdom. With the use of 
mud-brick architecture, the Chimor made their capital of Chan-Chan a grandiose walled 
complex and built a series of other cities with similar infrastructure models. Amidst a 
heavily urbanized region, the Chimor established an effective system of control that 
regulated the actions of local elites through supervision, military force, and tributes.30 
Following the fall of Wari, the region of southern Peru lost its urban population in favor 
of increasing rural societies. Similar to the situation in the nearby Altiplano, the political 
entities in southern Peru thrived in a state of constant conflict. Alliances only served to 
support the dominant group. Nonetheless, these competing societies ultimately sought to 
recreate what they considered a glorious past under the Wari and Tiwanaku empires.31 
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Development of the Inca state 
Under this political climate the Incas appeared in the Cuzco Valley. Small warring 
kingdoms also controlled this region which, as previously mentioned, had formerly 
served as a point of interaction between the Wari and Tiwanaku.32 According to Hubert 
Chanson, a hydraulic engineer whose research includes the development and effects of 
pre-Columbian South American irrigation systems, during the early thirteenth century 
the Incas were nothing more than “a small tribe in the southern highlands of Peru.”33 
Their early tactics focused on raiding and plundering rivals without establishing 
permanent control over them. This changed in the early fifteenth century with the 
accession of Wiraqocha Inka, whose conquest of the neighboring Ayamarca kingdom 
made the Incas “a political power in the Urubamba Valley.”34 Nonetheless, this new 
position of power brought forth animosity from neighboring states. 
In fact, the Inca government nearly ceased to exist after internal political turmoil and an 
invasion from the powerful Chanka, a rival group west of Cuzco, simultaneously struck 
in 1438. Historian Kenneth Andrien, a specialist of colonial Latin America, asserts that 
“factions of nobles and commoners” rallied in opposition to Wiraqocha and Inka Urqo, 
his favorite son and chosen successor, due to their policies of “political and religious 
consolidation.” Furthermore, Spanish chronicler and conquistador Pedro Cieza de León 
writes about the general disregard the people of Cuzco had for Urqo, whom they 
considered “cowardly, remiss, full of vices, and with few virtues.”35 The Chanka, aware 
of this political infighting and desiring the wealth of Cuzco, took the Inca’s troublesome 
situation as an opportunity to conquer the region.36 
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Rise of Pachakutiq 
In response to the Chanka invasion, Wiraqocha and Inka Urqo withdrew from Cuzco. 
Their departure from the city is depicted with minor differences by the Spanish 
chroniclers Juan de Betanzos and Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa. In the account of 
Betanzos, a conquistador who compiled his information from interviews with native 
inhabitants, Wiraqocha feared the might of Uscovilca, the Chanka’s leader, and after a 
conference with his high officials decided to escape along with his supporters to a hilltop 
fortress. Sarmiento de Gamboa’s account, also gathered from native oral tradition, places 
Wiraqocha’s decision as the result of a conspiracy by generals Vicaquirao and Apo 
Mayta, who were among those who suggested Wiraqocha to escape, in order to depose 
him and Urqo in favor of a more respectable ruler “who would treat them well and 
honourably.” Nevertheless, both accounts agree that during these times of trouble rose to 
prominence Kusi Inka Yupanki, the youngest son of Wiraqocha, by boldly refusing to 
abandon Cuzco and promising to defend it with his life.37 By accident or with purpose, 
Apo Mayta and Vicaquirao found in Kusi the man to place in power. 
The events which followed ultimately saw the defenders of Cuzco succeed over the 
Chanka invaders, but exactly how they managed to emerge victorious remains unclear. 
Prior to the arrival of the Chankas, Juan de Betanzos describes the desperate attempts of 
Kusi to obtain military support from the chiefdoms surrounding Cuzco. The leaders of 
these polities expressed their support for him, but their provision of troops would only 
take place if Kusi first managed to assemble a strong army of his own. Despite he did 
not obtain the requested soldiers, Kusi gained the moral support of his neighbors and 
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managed to get his name and story spread to greater distances as his message got passed 
on to other states. This last deed may have been the decisive factor in the Inca’s victory 
as, at exactly the same time the Chanka troops invaded Cuzco, both Betanzos and 
Sarmiento de Gamboa agree that a large force of foreign soldiers stormed down the hills 
and turned the tide of the battle against the Chankas. All that is known about these 
foreign soldiers is that they came from lands in the south, but neither chronicler really 
goes into much detail about them. During the battle, Uscovilca was captured and killed, 
and at the end of the conflict Cuzco remained under the control of the Incas. According 
to Sarmiento de Gamboa, the surprised inhabitants expressed their honor for the young 
Kusi by calling him a variety of names, but the one which stuck with him for the rest of 
his life was Pachakutiq, “which means ‘overturner of the earth,’ alluding to the land and 
farms which they looked upon as lost.”38 However, celebrations aside, the rightful ruler 
of the Inca state remained in the fortress outside of Cuzco. 
Even after Pachakutiq achieved the impossible, Wiraqocha kept his preference for Inka 
Urqo. Yet, Pachakutiq had no intention of giving up his newfound power to his brother. 
María Rostworowski de Díez Canseco explains that Urqo and Wiraqocha in an act of 
jealousy unsuccessfully attempted to ambush and murder Pachakutiq, but their plans 
only ended up causing the death of Urqo. Wiraqocha eventually also died, but he never 
accepted Pachakutiq as his successor.39 Nonetheless, Kenneth Andrien affirms that by 
this time Pachakutiq and his generals held “immense prestige and popularity,” which 
they used to “eliminate” any opposition to the new regime.40 Pachakutiq’s accession to 
the throne in 1438 marked a major change for western South America. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPANSION AND IMPERIALISM 
 
Upon achieving complete control over Cuzco and successfully establishing the Inca state 
as a major military power, Pachakutiq initiated another massive change for his people by 
expanding his kingdom’s control over societies across the Andean world. As maintained 
by archaeologist Terence D’Altroy, Incan expansion became a continuous process due to 
factors such as hostile neighbors threatening their national security and a strong policy of 
militarism which “carried over into the imperial era.” D’Altroy and archaeologist Alan 
Covey further add that climate continued to play an important role on Andean survival. 
Covey, an ethnohistorian of the Inca’s formation and imperial strategies, specifically 
mentions how “a prolonged drought” in the thirteenth century caused an increased 
competition for agricultural resources.41 Based on these points, the Inca expansion can 
be explained as the consequence of a contest for survival.  
Yet, under Pachakutiq the Inca expansion symbolized more than a necessity to survive. 
He began the tradition of a dual military leadership between the current emperor and his 
chosen successor as a means of providing him with experience and notability. Moreover, 
as will be described in later chapters, the Incas used their expansion as a means to 
expand their cultural practices over what they considered uncivilized societies.42 In order 
to provide a better understanding of the initial Inca interactions with their subjects and 
one of the primary reasons resistance and revolts against the Incas took place at different 
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stages, the following sections examine the reasons for the Inca expansion and the 
different tactics used by the Incas to obtain control over western South America. 
 
Legacy of Wari and Tiwanaku 
The demise of Wari and Tiwanaku at the start of the twelfth century AD did not erase 
their existence in the minds of Andean societies. Marks of their empires remained fresh 
not only as a result of their public works, but also due to their style of government. Thus, 
during this time civilizations such as the Chimor, according to international law expert 
and philosopher Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, “combined the organizational sense of the Wari 
with the taste for the spectacular of the Tiwanaku.”43 The Incas were no exception. 
Wari provided a strong foundation for the development of the Inca Empire. For example, 
Gordon McEwan, whose research presents one of the most detailed descriptions of the 
Wari’s influence on the Incas, mentions that the Incas adopted the Wari “tapestry tunics” 
for their nobility and Wari architecture for their capital. Moreover, as noted by Alan 
Covey, the road system left by the Wari proved particularly helpful once the Incas began 
administering their conquered territories. Ultimately, both anthropologists agree that 
Wari’s model of statecraft served as a springboard for the Inca state.44 Nevertheless, 
much is still not known about the Wari’s legacy on the Inca Empire. While McEwan and 
cultural historian Juha Hiltunen propose that Wari and Tiwanaku impacted the Inca state 
equally, the Incas “for political reasons” provided “more precedence to Tiwanaku.”45 
Yet, even if the Inca’s claim unfairly diminishes Wari’s role, Tiwanaku certainly played a 
crucial part on Incan state development. 
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Indeed, the Incas adapted from Tiwanaku aspects similarly taken from Wari, but the 
Tiwanaku’s ideological influence over the Incas marked a huge difference in both their 
politics and religion. As in the case with Wari, the Incas used the masonry techniques of 
the Tiwanaku to improve their architecture.46 Ideologically, McEwan argues that the 
Incas had a fascination with Tiwanaku. For instance, the site at Tiwanaku “was revered 
as a holy place,” and the Incas based their origin story in such a way so as to that they 
seemed to be a continuation to the Tiwanaku. Interesting to note is that McEwan claims 
the Incas claimed themselves as “the true inheritors of the prestigious Tiwanaku 
tradition,” meaning that other civilizations also had a stake at this claim.47 Nonetheless, 
another good point to mention at this time is the position of Latin American and Spanish 
literature expert James Wilson, who states that “the pre-existing Tiahuanaco empire was 
alien to both Aymara survivors and Inca conquerors.” While Wilson does not contradict 
the idea that the Incas adapted Tiwanaku’s ideology, he paints a much more aggressive 
tone on the picture by claiming that “the Incas wiped out [Tiwanaku] oral history and 
memory to replace it with their own.”48 Based on this research and the influence the 
Wari and Tiwanaku had over other contemporary Andean civilizations, it seems unlikely 
that the Inca’s original goal was that of erasing the existence of Tiwanaku. However, 
Wilson’s position gains better applicability with the passing of time in Andean history. 
As noted by anthropologist Katharina Schreiber, overtime the Wari and Tiwanaku 
civilizations vanished out of memory. This void in turn left the situation open for the 
Incas to receive attributions for inventions that did not belong to them.49 As such, 
regardless of the original intentions of the Inca state, they ultimately attained recognition 
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for structures and concepts originally from Wari and Tiwanaku—a result which, as later 
chapters shall demonstrate, must have raised few complaints within the Inca elite. 
 
Necessity and ambition 
The grand expansion of the Inca Empire also represented a variety of goals and ideals 
driven both by necessity and ambition. The most immediate reason is the constant threats 
of invasion the Incas faced from hostile neighbors. According to anthropologist Terence 
D’Altroy, Incan expansionism made nearby civilizations such as the Chimor view them 
as aggressors. In turn, this caused unfriendly relations between both states.50 Moreover, 
the climate of the Andean region also promoted the Incas into a search for lands with 
greater agricultural outputs. Archaeologist Alan Covey explains how earthquakes and El 
Niño, a climate pattern known for causing problems such as floods and droughts, can 
“reduce confidence in the political and religious systems in which affected groups 
participate.”51 D’Altroy relates this situation with Andean expansionism, mentioning that 
the Andean region of southern Peru had been the victim of “a prolonged drought.” Given 
the complicated case, Andean civilizations needed to expand their domains in order to 
obtain resources necessary for survival.52 In these cases of hostile neighbors and adverse 
climate of these cases, a necessity for peace and protection can be attributed as causes 
for the Incan expansion. 
Nonetheless, the Incan expansion also grew out of ambition for greater wealth. Covey 
describes the Cuzco region as economically dependent on agriculture, specifically maize 
farming. Despite the productivity of Cuzco provided the Incas with “substantiated 
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surpluses of agricultural products” required for funding state projects, the Incas desired 
greater wealth. Nearby regions held a wider variety of resources. One particular example 
regards the Inca conquest of the Chachapoyas, a former Andean state in whose capital is 
in present-day northern Peru. Anthropologist Warren Church and archaeologist Adriana 
von Hagen argue that the Incas were willing to spend much time pacifying the constant 
revolts of the Chachapoyas because their location had exotic goods such as bird feathers 
and animal pelts, produced spices, cacao, coca leaves, honey, and cotton (among other 
things) which the Incas desired for use in things like decorative headdresses and 
textiles.53 Evidence of Cuzco’s increased wealth during the Inca expansion is 
exemplified in the Temple of the Sun, the holiest religious structure in the empire. Susan 
Niles, an expert of Inca anthropology, states that during the reign of Pachakutiq, the 
Temple of the Sun received large amounts of gold and silver which was used to adorn its 
walls, construct religious objects, and honor mummified ancestors housed at the sacred 
place. Other important buildings in Cuzco also benefited from these spoils of war, with 
descriptions of their grandeur mentioned in the narratives of both Incas and Spaniards.54 
However, as shall be discussed in the next chapter, that the Incas spent part of their 
conquered wealth in religious structures holds a much more relevant concept to their 
expansion rather than just that of adorning Cuzco.   
The following section analyzes two contrasting methods of expansion effectively used 
by the Incas, diplomacy and warfare. Figure 2 shows the vast expansion of the Inca 
Empire since the reign of Pachakutiq until the reign of Wayna Qhapaq. Most of the 
conquests were carried out by Pachakutiq and his son Tupaq Inka Yupanki. 
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                      Figure 2. Map of the Inca Empire’s expansion since 1438 until 1527.55 
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Diplomacy and warfare 
Once Pachakutiq took command, the Incas underwent a relatively repetitive process of 
expansion that proved quite effective. Anthropologist Gordon McEwan argues that the 
Incas knew that, in the long-run, “it was ultimately inefficient and impractical” to kill 
future subjects and risk losing imperial soldiers in the process.56 McEwan’s argument is 
sustained by economist Louis Baudin, who claims that for the Incas “diplomacy took 
precedence over force.” They first sent emissaries to the places under their scope of 
conquest, and these emissaries in turn provided information on the benefits of peacefully 
joining the empire and the adversities of refusing to peacefully integrate. According to 
Baudin, benefits assured included the sharing of “civilization” with Cuzco and the 
incorporation of the local hierarchy into the imperial hierarchy. Otherwise, refusal meant 
war and their ultimate destruction by the Incan armies.57 Still, emissaries were not the 
only tool of diplomacy with which the Incas attained their desired goals. 
Intimidation also played a role in the diplomatic expansions of the Inca Empire. The 
large size of the Inca army alone caused fear among the populace. McEwan writes that 
the Incas first sent their troops “to the enemy’s doorstep,” and afterwards sent in the 
emissaries.58 Social anthropologist Fernando Santos Granero explains how fear of the 
Inca military allowed them expansion into such places as Vilcabamba, whose leaders 
simply surrendered rather than face the massive Inca army.59 Not surprisingly, weaker 
states opted to join the empire instead of facing imminent extermination. Nevertheless, 
in cases where these civilizations refused to peacefully join the Inca Empire, the Incas 
were equally prepared to use more aggressive tactics like sieges and open warfare. 
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Pachakutiq instituted a flexible system of warfare that attained its ends without the need 
of brute force. For instance, rather than making direct attacks, an alternative method 
used by the armies of Pachakutiq focused on laying siege to their enemies (preventing 
the entry of supplies and communications). Historian Burr Cartwright Brundage 
mentions one such siege, when the Soras peoples of the Altiplano refused to join the 
Incas and instead fortified their defenses in a massive rock called Challcomarca. 
Pachacuti’s troops failed in their assault of Challcomarca, and so they instead laid siege 
to the place for two years. During the time of the siege most of the Soras starved to 
death, forcing the survivors to surrender.60 This situation additionally demonstrates that 
time was not a problem as long as the objective was completed. 
When direct attacks were used, the Incas also had the upper hand due to the large size of 
their army and the ingenuity of Pachakutiq. According to McEwan, warfare was won by 
whoever inflicted the largest amount of casualties. In his view, during the battle “Inca 
formations lost all cohesion” and officers were unable “to maneuver troops as a unit 
once they became engaged.” In other words, the massive size of the imperial army made 
it practically unstoppable, albeit also uncontrollable. In spite of this, Baudin contends 
that Pachakutiq scouted the battlefield to find the opposing leader or central religious 
object, a method “which seems to have been new,” and together with a small band of 
soldiers focused on capturing the aforementioned leader or object. This way he 
demoralized his opponents, paving the way for an even easier victory.61 Both of these 
explanations are perfectly plausible together, and provide a livelier picture of Andean 
warfare with success attributed to efficiency in both structure and agency.  
25 
 
From conqueror to statesman 
After approximately thirty years as the commander of a rapid expansion across the 
varied terrains of western South America, Pachakutiq gave up his role in the Incan army 
in favor of his son Tupaq Inka Yupanki in 1463. Historian David Del Testa states that 
Pachakutiq retired because he sought to improve “the governance of the Incan Empire,” 
including developments in commerce and infrastructure.62 Anthropologist William Isbell 
adds another reason for Pachakutiq deciding to focus on imperial administration, this 
being his desire “to create a regal capital city and an illustrious dynasty of privileged 
emperors from a dusty village and a succession of grizzly war chiefs.” Isbell also claims 
that Tupaq was selected as Pachakutiq’s successor because he was “militarily brilliant” 
and more ambitious than his brother Amaru Inka.63 Both of these explanations create a 
certain aura of grandeur around Pachakutiq, his decision to retire based on nothing more 
than his desire to improve the Inca Empire.  
Nonetheless, when time is taken into account, a more humanistic reason can also be 
added to Pachakutiq’s decision to retire from the military. Chronicler Garcilaso de la 
Vega attributes the decision as Pachakutiq’s self-realization of his old age. David Del 
Testa approximates Pachakutiq’s birth to 1408, placing his age at around fifty-five when 
he retired from the armed forces.64 It makes perfect sense that after thirty or so years of 
active military service Pachakutiq decided to retire, and this in no way contradicts his 
other reasons for deciding to focus on administering his vast empire. The following 
chapter shall focus on Pachakutiq’s role as a statesman and his creation of administrative 
concepts that remained in place until the fall of the Inca Empire. 
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CHAPTER V 
REGULATIONS 
 
The various cultures within the Inca Empire posed an obstacle to Pachakutiq’s imperial 
ambitions. In order to solve this problem and obtain full control of the state, he sought to 
unify the country. Richard Schaedel, a researcher of Latin American anthropology and 
ethnography, argues that Pachakutiq thus executed a policy of standardization in “all of 
the provinces, despite their wide socio-cultural and economic differences.”65 In terms of 
area, anthropologist Bruce Trigger explains that the Incas placed greater emphasis on 
standardizing the Andean highlands than the coastal regions. Needless to say, the 
highlands were the home of the Incas; hence, their emphasis on what Trigger defines as 
the highland “core” is logical. However, coastal polities such as the Chimor were also 
affected by the Inca’s imperial policies.66 In this analysis, the standardizations 
established by the Inca government shall be referred to as regulations. 
This chapter shall focus on the regulations imposed by Pachakutiq on the ideological, 
social, political, and economic aspects of life in western South America. These domains 
were not arbitrarily chosen, but rather they are typical anthropological domains used to 
study early states. According to archaeological anthropologists Christopher Scarre and 
Brian Fagan, “the combination of economic productivity, the control over sources and 
distribution of food and wealth, the segregation and maintenance of the stratified social 
systems and its ideology, and the ability to maintain control by force where the vital 
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ingredients of early states.”67 Given their similarities, and for the sake of maintaining the 
format established by Scarre and Fagan in their third edition of Ancient Civilizations, the 
ideological and social domains shall be combined into one section. 
 
Political regulations 
Inca supremacy functioned as the keystone to Pachakutiq’s complex imperial formation. 
As explained in Chapter III, prior to the formation of the Inca Empire the urban north 
and rural south areas of Ancient Peru engaged in constant fighting.68 Under the empire, 
the different nations all responded to central Inca authority, and interaction between each 
of the provinces was limited. Historian Alfonso Klauer denotes that the Incas “subjected 
a heterogeneous group of nations, where each was only related with the imperial Inca 
nation, and disconnected with the rest even when they were in their proximities.”69 
Richard Schaedel attributes this state organization to Pachakutiq, who also devised an 
ingenious government structure which organized the Inca Empire into four regions: 
Antisuyu (northeast), Kuntisuyu (southwest), Chinchaysuyu (northwest), and Qullasuyu 
(southeast). Within each region the Incas established a meticulous division of power in a 
pyramidal structure where each level was in charge of the immediate level below it. For 
example, the head curaca, or chief, or a province would be in charge of 100 lower chiefs 
whom, in turn, were in charge of 100 households each, and so on. Thus, Pachakutiq 
created a system where every part of society was rigidly controlled.70  
Figure 3 shows the location of the four regions and Cuzco’s central position as imperial 
capital. In this map, Cuzco is separated from the four regions for the sake of perspective. 
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           Figure 3. Imperial Divisions of the Inca Empire.71 
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Government control also included the creation and use of a secret surveillance system. 
The tokoyrikoq (“those who sees all”) investigated both subjects and administrators 
either publicly or in secrecy. Their duty included checking everyone’s job and reporting 
any mistakes or laziness.72 The internal espionage greatly restricted free will. No one 
could speak against the government or take individual actions outside of the established 
norm for fear of the tokoyrikoq’s accusation and consequent punishment under Inca 
law.73 Although this research could not effectively conclude when this intelligence 
system began, its effect on Inca daily life are notable enough to require its mention. 
Related to the tokoyrikoq is the Inca legal system, which functioned as another effective 
instrument of political control. Pachakutiq contributed twenty-seven laws to this system 
which, despite the existence of prior complex organizations, the Incas considered the 
first of its kind in the Andes. According to historian Sabine MacCormack, Pachakutiq’s 
laws dealt with the provinces and the imperial capital, and they included “regulations for 
the distribution of goods from Inca storehouses and for punishing theft from these 
storehouses and elsewhere.” One law even dealt with fire safety, which was important 
given that houses in Cuzco had thatched roofs. This law allowed neighbors of a burning 
house to take the house’s belongings, after putting down the fire, to punish the careless 
owner.74 Unsurprisingly, under Inca law the emperor was supreme judge and decided on 
all cases involving the death penalty. If the emperor was absent, curacas served as 
judges and were punished if they disobeyed the rules.75 All complexities aside, political 
scientist Joan Prats i Català claims that Inca law stood on three basic standards: “Ama 
Suwa (do not steal), Ama Llulla (do not lie), and Ama Qhilla (do not be lazy).”76  
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Though harsh, punishment within this legal structure focused on teaching lessons to 
society. Historian John Malam depicts the Inca judicial process as a simple procedure 
where the accused went on trial and, if found guilty, faced either terrible death or severe 
public shame. Death sentences ranged from “beheading, stoning, being thrown off a 
cliff, or being tossed into a pit full of wild animals,” while lesser sentences included 
“whipping, losing an eye, a hand or foot, losing property, or being deported to another 
part of the empire and never [be] allowed to return home.” However, if the criminal was 
young or a first-time offender, the punishment was less severe and acted as a warning.77 
Gordon McEwan explains that the nobility received lighter penalties for their offences 
because the Incas believed that even the lightest of punishments brought them great 
humiliation. Nonetheless, if a person “stole food out of necessity,” then his castigation 
would be lessened and the curaca of his province received punishment “for not taking 
care of his people.” Thereupon, Malam argues that “people respected the law and knew 
what to expect should they do wrong,” a position backed by McEwan who writes that 
“the justice system was so efficient that the Spaniards frequently remarked on the very 
low crime rate in the Inca Empire.”78 
 
Economic regulations 
Aside from a strong set of political regulations, Pachakutiq also set his sights on heavily 
controlling the economic structure of the Inca Empire. In this case, Pachakutiq had to 
deal with the situation that most Andean ethnic communities focused their economic 
activities on pastoral work and intensive farming.79 One of the earliest actions taken by 
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Pachakutiq was the establishment of a road system that linked all provinces within the 
imperial economic structure. As explained in Chapter IV, the Inca roads used the Wari 
road system as their foundation. However, as noted by Gordon McEwan, the Incas not 
only expanded the road system but also “standardized highways” and “linked the various 
regions of the growing empire to Cusco.”80 In terms of trade, as noted by historian 
Hernán Horna, the roads improved the exchange of goods and the movement of labor.81 
Yet, the purpose of the roads went beyond that of improving trade. 
While most authors mention the regulatory aspects of the road system, few emphasize its 
importance in Pachakutiq’s policy of standardization.  Among the few is archaeologist 
John Hyslop, who writes that “to conquered populations throughout the Inka empire, the 
roads were an omnipresent symbol of the power and authority of the Inka state.”82 Horna 
and McEwan add support to Hyslop’s argument by explaining the important role the 
roads played for the army’s movement and population control. McEwan states that rest 
stops, called tambos, “were built to serve the army as it marched.” For his part, Horna 
mentions that “the roads also enabled the control of population movements.”83 Thus, the 
Inca roads of Pachakutiq in essence were an arm of the state’s power which was used to 
ensure that everyone followed the law of the Inca and mobilize the army to rebel areas.  
Figure 4 shows the road network of the Inca Empire. The map only depicts the major 
roads of the empire. During Pachakutiq’s reign, the system was incipient and did not 
have the massive size depicted in this map. Overtime it reached nearly every single 
region of the Inca Empire, serving as the veins to a powerful central government. 
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           Figure 4: The Inca Road System.84 
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In addition to the road system, Pachakutiq founded the chasqui messenger system, which 
kept rapid communication alive across large distances. María Rostworowski de Díez 
Canseco explains that the chasqui messengers were selected among the men who were 
agile and good runners, but an Inca prince took charge as the supervisor of the rest stops 
along the road.85 Chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega claims that the messengers followed a 
relay system, and that “every fourth of a league” a new messenger continued the trip in 
order to keep a constant flow of messages. The transfer of information took place either 
orally or with the use of quipus, a recording device which used a system of strings and 
knots. Moreover, with the use of smoke signals the chasqui could, “in two or three hours 
at the most,” notify the Inca of any uprising within the empire.86 In other words, the 
effective communication network aside, the emphasis of this system was on regulation. 
Inca policies of constant expansionism and regulation came at a cost in terms of 
manpower, but the Incas found a way to replenish such costs while also continuing to 
further regulate the economic aspects of society. Historian Patricia Temoche Cortez 
notes that the Incas used, as a method of “unification and domination,” the mit’a system. 
The mit’a permitted curacas the option of trading human workers in exchange for goods 
from the central government. Pachacutec did not invent the system, but knew about it 
and “generalized it across the state.”87 Latin American historian David Rock claims the 
Incas used the mit’a mostly for construction. Nonetheless, Gordon McEwan argues that 
the Incas used the mit’a not only to improve the empire’s economic infrastructure, but 
also to keep people busy enough to prevent any revolts against the state.88
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Unsurprisingly, the Inca Empire’s economy was under a pyramidal structure which 
positioned the Incas at the top. Anthropologist Katherine Newman considers that the 
Inca administered “a planned economy in which the administration of law through royal 
edict played an important role.”89 Nevertheless, interesting is that the Incas effectively 
used their economic planning to regulate both the upper and lower strata of their social 
pyramid. Their tool in this case was redistribution, which for the Incas constituted a 
noble work entrusted to them by the gods.90 Chronicler Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas 
describes the redistribution as a simple process during which the Incas took the private 
property of conquered groups, “leaving no man any property,” and then redistributed it 
as they saw fit.91 According to anthropologist H.W. Kaufmann and researcher J.E. 
Kaufmann, Inca redistribution focused on helping people in difficult economic times. 
However, Rostworowski points out that most goods served as gifts to the keep the 
curacas, military officials, and nobles loyal to the state.92 Thus, the Incas effectively 
used their economic control to keep those without power equally subordinate to them, 
and keep those with power loyal to the ruling class and central government. 
 
Social and ideological regulations 
Living within the Inca Empire meant living with a defined social status regulated by the 
authorities. Archaeologist Ann Kendall argues that “Inca social organization was strictly 
hierarchical and relationships in the family and civil life were very clearly defined, so 
that no individual, family, or large group failed to understand their role within their 
province or within the empire in any given circumstances.”93 The provinces were not the 
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only ones subject to this kind of social structure. As indicated by historians William 
Duiker and Jackson Spielgovel, “the social status and economic functions of the 
residents of [Cuzco] were rigidly defined.”94 The Incas attained this social control 
through a mixture of impositions in education, language, and religion.  
The Incas used education as a tool to control the masses, both the commoners and the 
nobility. Inka Roq’a, great-grandfather to Pachakutiq, founded the empire’s educational 
system in the late thirteenth century. For his part, Pachakutiq reformed the system, but 
also kept certain aspects of it in place. Based on Garcilaso de la Vega’s account that 
Tupaq Inka Yupanki supported Inka Roq’a’s restrictions which forbid commoners from 
entering the Inca schools, this research can logically conclude that Pachakutiq also kept 
these restrictions during his reign. This was apparently done for fear that, upon gaining 
knowledge, the commoners could challenge the state.95 Anthropologist Terence D’Altroy 
states that commoners instead learned skills like farming, crafting, and hunting from 
their parents.96 On the other hand, nobles received 4-year schooling from the amautas 
(the wise men) in areas such as language, warfare, religion, science, history, and 
mathematics. Students focused their third year of study on learning how to use the 
quipu.97 This curriculum in a way is a form of regulation on the nobility, but the most 
obvious case of education control was on the provincial nobility. One of Pachakutiq’s 
reforms included taking the sons of provincial curacas as hostages to Cuzco in order to 
indoctrinate them into Inca culture. D’Altroy explains that they studied alongside the 
other nobles, and were later returned to their provinces as the new curacas.98 
36 
 
A closely related concept to the educational regulations was the language standardization 
initiated by Pachakutiq. According to Gordon McEwan, Quechua (the language spoken 
by the Incas) originated in central Peru “more than a thousand years” prior to the 
development of Inca civilization.99 At least 700 different languages existed in Peru by 
the time the Spaniards arrived to the Andes, which economist Louis Baudin considers “a 
major difficulty encountered by the [Inca] rulers.” Pachakutiq tried to resolve this 
problem by forcing all peoples within the empire to learn Quechua.100  
Language and education aside, another important aspect of Inca social regulation was 
religion. In fact, the Inca’s religion supported their expansionism by emanating a belief 
of their cultural superiority over neighboring nations. The Incas believed that Inti, their 
sun god, sent his children Manco Capac and Mama Ocllo with the duty of bringing 
civilization to the ancestors of the Inca peoples who lived in ignorance. The Incas took 
this concept along with their conquests in western South America, and viewed their 
expansion as a noble work with a holy purpose. Subsequent Inca rulers, including 
Pachakutiq, held this ideal throughout their interaction with neighboring cultures.101 
Moreover, as noted by Gordon McEwan, “sometimes the Incas would actually take the 
god or its idol and priests to reside in Cuzco, where it could serve as a hostage for the 
good behavior of its worshippers.” Nonetheless, McEwan adds that the Incas held “a 
much more tolerant view” than the Spanish religion, and it allowed the worship of local 
deities “as long as they were willing to also revere and honor the Inca gods.”102 Religion 
thus played a vital role in the beginnings of the expansion of the Inca Empire and in the 
aspects of social regulation. 
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Of course, one important aspect which may seem to be missing from this analysis is 
whether the Inca’s regulations were in due course successful in achieving the unity of the 
state. On that note, anthropologist Bruce Trigger provides a reference to Spanish Jesuit 
missionary Bernabé Cobo, whom “described the Inka kingdom as a ‘single republic’.”103 
Indeed, no reason exists to doubt that the Incas were successful in places where people 
respected their authority. Otherwise, in places where large groups rebelled against them, 
Pachakutiq used the mitima, which was the movement of rebellious groups to other 
regions of the empire. Philip Ainsworth Means, a historian and anthropologist of Ancient 
Peru, recollected accounts of chroniclers Pedro Sarmiento and Garcilaso de la Vega 
which attribute Pachakutiq as the inventor of the mitima.104 Nonetheless, anthropologist 
Richard Schaedel argues that “generally speaking, the ethnic integrity of the conquered 
group was respected" by the Incas.105 
The following chapters shall address this issue of rebellions in detail and demonstrate 
that the regulations established by Pachakutiq ultimately failed to achieve the complete 
unity of the Inca state, and how that failure led to a series of events that caused the fall of 
the Inca Empire at the hands of Spain. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESISTANCE AND CIVIL WAR 
 
Despite Pachakutiq's several efforts at integration and centralization within the Inca 
Empire, Andean communities oftentimes took whatever opportunity they got to revolt 
against the empire or oppose Inca expansionism and regulation. Given these problems, 
historian Alfonso Klauer argues that the Inca’s imperial expectations never achieved 
their desired results of a completely unified state.106 This lack of unification not only 
proved problematic for Pachakutiq during his reign, but even after his death the social 
matrix of the Andean world remained deeply fragmented. In one case, as told by Pedro 
Cieza de León, even the people of Cuzco revolted against Tupaq Inka Yupanki, taking 
advantage that he was away in one of the imperial provinces.107 Hence, it should come to 
no surprise that it took little over half a century after the death of Pachakutiq for the Inca 
Empire to disintegrate into a state of civil war. 
This chapter shall connect the insurrections from the time of Pachakutiq, going through 
the reigns of his son Tupak Inka Yupanki and grandson Wayna Qhapaq, with the start of 
the Inca Civil War during the reign of his great-grandson Waskar Inka. At the root of this 
argument lies the premise of Andean autonomy, the desire of the conquered to determine 
their destiny. Therefore, prior to presenting the increasingly tumultuous situation of the 
Inca Empire, the chapter shall first focus on providing an analysis of Andean thought. 
Ultimately, all of this information shall be related with the Spanish Conquest. 
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Andean ideology 
In 1988, Richard Schaedel, an anthropologist and archaeologist of Peruvian civilizations, 
argued in his work “Andean World View” that pre-Inca Andean societies lived in 
chiefdoms which did not have a complex hierarchical structure of power. Furthermore, 
he claimed that “the regulatory and controlling mechanisms of state society” did not 
apply to Andean societies such as the Lupaca (an Aymara chiefdom), whose government 
structure “rested on the support of the village headman, which could be withdrawn with 
little penalty.”108 Schaedel based his argument not only on ethnohistorical studies about 
the Aymara, but also on the ancient Wari and Tiwanaku states and the later Inca 
civilization. He concluded that the Wari achieved nothing more than “an abortive effort 
at state formation by a conglomerate of ethnic groups” and that the Tiwanaku never 
attained “a great concentration of political power.” Regarding the Incas, Schaedel 
mentions how chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega provided information which showed that 
the Incas “converted the essentially reciprocal notion of duality [...] into one of 
superiority.”109 Essentially, the Incas formed and later introduced this notion of a 
complex and clearly stratified central state into societies which had little to no 
experience with such governments. 
This research for the most part agrees with Schaedel’s conclusions and, in a way, builds 
upon them by translating Andean social inexperience with authoritarian governments 
into opposition against Inca imperialism. Chapter III of this thesis even depicts how the 
inhabitants of Cuzco refused Wari imperialist ambitions on their region. Nonetheless, 
this investigation is much kinder to the Wari and Tiwanaku empires, and in Chapter IV 
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places their government structures as important foundations for the Inca Empire. That 
same chapter demonstrates that the Incas tried to claim a connection with the Tiwanaku. 
Additionally, going back to anthropologist Edward Lanning’s argument in Chapter III, 
Andean societies in southern Peru wanted to hold imperial control over their neighbors 
in the region.110 Combining Schaedel’s argument with the one from this thesis leads to 
the conclusion that while Andean societies sought to impose themselves as dominant 
imperial entities, in turn they did not want to be dominated by anyone else and none 
actually had an idea of how to govern an empire. Thus, Pachakutiq and the Incas played 
an innovative role in the context of Andean history; a role later to be taken up by Spain. 
With this complicated concept of Andean imperialism and ideology understood, the 
subsequent sections focus on the continuous resistance the Incas faced from Andean 
societies outside and within the borders of their empire. While the focus of this thesis 
remains Inca imperialism during Pachakutiq’s reign, in order to provide a complete 
connection between Pachakutiq and the Spanish conquest it is necessary to briefly 
describe the development of the empire through the reigns of later emperors. 
 
Rebellion and resistance under Pachakutiq 
The Incas faced resistance to their rule at least since the time of Pachakutiq’s father 
Wiraqocha. Archaeologist Thomas Athol Joyce, former president of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, claims that the Chanka invasion 
(which led to the rise of Pachakutiq) was partially a response to the Inca’s imposition of 
their sun-worshipping religion over the “low form of huaca-worship” that characterized 
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Andean civilizations such as the Chanka.111 Thus, even before the start of the Inca 
expansion under Pachakutiq, civilizations already showed resistance to Inca domination. 
As time passed, things went from bad to worse as Pachakutiq’s empire faced insurrection 
from provinces that had supposedly been already conquered and pacified. Spanish 
chronicler Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa writes that the peoples conquered by Pachakutiq 
“obeyed so long as they felt the force compelling them, and, as soon as they were a little 
free from that fear, they presently rebelled and resumed their liberty.”112 In one particular 
case, chronicled by Juan de Betanzos, the provinces of Qullasuyu rebelled against the 
Incas when one of the provincial leaders declared himself “son of the Sun.” Pachakutiq 
then sent a force to quell the rebellion.113 Therefore, uprisings were not unheard of even 
within those domains most proximate to the Inca heartland of Cuzco. 
Lastly, according to the Andean legend of Ollantay, Pachakutiq ended his reign as 
emperor of the Incas amidst an ongoing revolt within his own army. Frederick Luciani, 
Latin American literature expert, explains that considerable debate exists as to how much 
indigenous elements remain in this tale which was turned into a play during the colonial 
era. The story deals with the character of Ollantay, a prominent warrior, who leads a 
rebellion against Pachakutiq because he will not let him marry an Inca princess. When 
Pachakutiq died in 1474, Ollantay was finally allowed to return to his loved one.114 H.W. 
Kaufmann and J.E. Kaufmann argue that Pachakutiq’s son, Tupaq Inka Yupanki, more 
than likely took this decision in order to “end a rebellion that was getting out of hand.”115 
Two aspects can be concluded from this tale. If the work itself is nothing more than 
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fiction, it demonstrates that rebellions were a subject commonplace enough to be 
remembered in an oral story. However, if the work is based in truth, then it demonstrates 
that, during his lifetime, Pachakutiq never achieved the unification of his empire. 
 
Tupaq Inka Yupanki 
Tupaq succeeded Pachakutiq to the throne in 1474, and from then on the expert military 
man used his knowledge on tactics to further expand the Inca Empire. Historians 
William Hamblin and Jay Pascal Anglin claim that Tupaq “doubled the size of the 
empire by military conquests of parts of modern Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile.”116 
Nonetheless, his actions were not without consequence. Archaeologist Stuart Fiedel 
attributes overextension as one of the possible reasons for the fall of the Inca Empire.117 
Even though Fiedel does not specifically mention Tupaq Inka Yupanki as the culprit, 
based on the Hamblin and Anglin source it can be logically concluded that Tupaq caused 
the overextension problem for the empire. 
Despite Tupaq Inka Yupanki fulfilled his role as emperor by using his skills as a military 
tactician and conqueror, his administrative skills proved insufficient and oftentimes even 
nonexistent. Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa recorded from oral stories that, during the 
reign of Pachakutiq, Tupaq disappeared at least a couple of times while on his military 
expeditions and left people wondering whether he was dead or alive. One of these times 
he seems to have even made it as far away as Polynesia (located in the South Pacific 
Ocean).118 When he became emperor, Tupaq also faced problems of insurrection from 
his supposedly conquered subjects. John Hemming, an explorer and expert Inca 
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researcher, recounts of a rebellion during the reign of Tupaq which took place in the vital 
Lake Titicaca region. The emperor took care of the problem by defeating the rebels in 
two major battles.119 Although that is not different from the actions Pachakutiq took to 
quell rebellions, in other instances Tupaq’s clear inability to efficiently administer 
problematic situations is quite evident. For example, María Rostworowski de Díez 
Canseco describes an “embarrassing situation” which Tupaq faced when rebels of Peru’s 
central coast maintained their uprising for twelve years. His inability to stop the 
rebellion by normal means resulted in his decision to request his priests to use magic, but 
ultimately what came to his aid was a climatic disaster that forced the rebel’s 
surrender.120 In another situation, when a group of 300 people who came with gifts for 
the emperor had the bad luck to arrive at a time when crops were failing, Tupaq resolved 
to have them and their treasures buried.121 Thereupon, Tupaq Inka Yupanki, the great 
conqueror, was not a great governor. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of providing a complete picture of this Inca emperor and not to 
dismiss him as completely incompetent, it is important to acknowledge some of the good 
deeds Tupaq Inka Yupanki achieved as emperor. According to Pedro Cieza de León, 
Tupaq managed to skillfully pacify a series of coastal insurrections through the use of 
gifts.122 If the account is true, then Tupaq’s ability as a diplomat perhaps was not as lost 
as this research indicates. Additionally, Juan de Betanzos notes that, during his early 
reign as emperor, Tupaq left his elder brother as governor in Cuzco, and even set up a 
succession system in case his brother died while he was away conquering (or pacifying) 
territories.123 The Betanzos account demonstrates that Tupaq knew his limitations as 
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administrator and, while away on his conquests, did not irresponsibly leave the empire 
without a governor. Yet, administrative problems followed Tupaq until the end of his life. 
In 1493, after a mere 22 years as emperor, Tupaq Inka Yupanki died and left the Inca 
Empire in gubernatorial chaos. The emperor’s passing away was unexpected, his death 
being the result either of an arrow wound, poisoning, or simply an illness. Rostworowski 
de Díez Canseco denotes that “he was said to be neither young nor old at the time of his 
death.” A succession crisis ensued, leading to a fight “between the factions of the two 
candidates,” one named Capac Guari and the other Tito Cusi Gualpa. However, even 
after Tito Cusi Gualpa’s faction won, the boy was too young to rule and, thus, caused 
another minor struggle for the regency within his faction. The new ruler took the name 
Wayna Qhapaq, which Betanzos claims was given to him by his uncle and that it means 
“Young Great King.”124 Now it was up to Tupaq’s son to stabilize a massive empire. 
 
 Wayna Qhapaq and the Pax Incaica 
The reign of Wayna Qhapaq is characterized in Inca history with the Pax Incaica, a 
period which contrasts between the relative peace among Andean civilizations within the 
Inca Empire and the ever-increasing problems faced by the Inca government. For 
instance, anthropologist Charles Stanish describes the Pax Incaica as a time when the 
states of the Altiplano reduced the amount of warfare among themselves.125 In the area 
of economics, this period also saw the improvement in “the transport of goods over long 
distances.”126 This evidence of peace and prosperity in the one hand contrasts sharply 
with the evidence of war and incrementing government control over Andean peoples. 
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According to historian David Cahill, “the pax incaica was an agony for small kingdoms, 
[...] the glory of autonomy was in some cases a living memory, such that tribute in kind, 
labour and army levies, and the imposition of Incan satraps and bureaucrats served only 
to underscore what had been lost.”127 Regarding the increasing warfare faced by the Inca 
government, archaeologist Thomas Patterson notes that “in its attempt to assert a pax 
incaica throughout its domain, the imperial state was almost continuously at war.”128 
Despite these problems, which at first hand may seem to exemplify instability, historian 
David Del Testa argues that Wayna Qhapaq “kept the Incan Empire strong in the face of 
growing internal divisions and external threats.” Similarly, anthropologist Kim 
MacQuarrie claims that, under Wayna Qhapaq, “the super-nova that was the Inca Empire 
had reached its zenith.”129 Therefore, the Pax Incaica represents the apogee of the Inca 
state, with its regulations and display of strength at a peak. 
Nonetheless, Wayna Qhapaq ruled the Inca Empire with an iron fist which, although 
effective, proved to further increase social unrest and enmity towards the government. 
Rostworowski de Díez Canseco writes that Wayna Qhapaq was possibly “the ruler who 
put down the greatest number of rebellions.”130 Moreover, the animosity he obtained in 
exchange was quite large due to his aggressive tactics of pacifying uprisings. David Del 
Testa claims that the emperor “alienated many local leaders by using wholesale slaughter 
of local rebels.” He further adds that Wayna Qhapaq “did nothing to improve economic 
conditions, and increasingly assumed ceremonial and religious fuctions himself, 
depriving others of purpose and pride.”131 If that was not enough, the emperor also 
angered the Inca nobility. Drawing on events such as Wayna Qhapaq’s appropriation of 
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state property for personal use and a story which told how the emperor was forced to use 
gifts to regain support from the Inca elite, historian Karen Spalding argues that Wayna 
Qhapaq clashed with the Inca nobility for government control.132 As such, based on the 
evidence, this research sees in Wayna Qhapaq a person with a different and much more 
aggressive perspective on state unification than Pachakutiq and Tupaq Inka Yupanki. Not 
only that, but he also sought to consolidate state power in his position as emperor at the 
expense of the Inca elite. 
Ultimately, Wayna Qhapaq died an unexpected death as a result of smallpox, a disease 
unknown to the Incas, leaving a politically fractured empire. The emperor died in 1527 
while in a military campaign in the north, near present-day Colombia and Ecuador.  Del 
Testa claims that the smallpox disease entered the Inca Empire from the Chiriguana 
peoples of present-day Paraguay. When the Incas retook areas taken by the Chiriguana, 
they also acquired the European disease from “renegade Spaniards” who accompanied 
the natives. However, historian Curt Lamar contends that the disease entered from the 
north along with the Spaniards.133 Considering the speed with which the disease affected 
the Inca Empire, this research concludes both arguments as non-contradictory and 
perfectly logical. Making matters worse, the disease also killed Ninan Cuyochi, Wayna 
Qhapaq’s heir, leaving the Incas without a leader. In this context, Wayna Qhapaq further 
complicated the subsequent situation. Archaeologist Gordon McEwan explains that 
Wayna Qhapaq set up a headquarters in present-day Ecuador “that rivaled the official 
imperial court in Cuzco.” Upon his death, the new northern faction competed against 
Cuzco for imperial control.134 The Inca Empire headed towards civil war. 
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Inca Civil War 
Following the death of Wayna Qhapaq, a period of uncertainty took place as political 
factions within the Inca Empire focused their support on two of Wayna Qhapaq’s sons, 
Waskar Inka and Atawallpa. The southern faction, based on the imperial capital of 
Cuzco, initially provided their support for Waskar. However, it seems that this initial 
support mainly came as a result of him being co-regent in Cuzco at the time of Wayna 
Qhapaq’s death. McEwan explains that Wayna Qhapaq apparently wanted to remove 
Waskar from power in Cuzco, but never had the chance as a result of his unexpected 
death.135 Meanwhile, in the north, the generals of Wayna Qhapaq influenced Atawallpa 
“to rebel against his brother.” Rostworowski de Díez Canseco asserts that they took this 
decision for personal reasons, as they feared Waskar would diminish their power. Still, 
historian Burr Cartwright Brundage explains that Waskar’s violent actions, including the 
imprisonment and starvation of one of their younger brothers, pushed Atawallpa into 
accepting the position of leadership from the northern faction.136 So it was that the civil 
war developed as a result of both factions and agents looking out for their own interests. 
The conflict also involved the non-Inca societies of the empire. For example, the Cañaris 
of present-day southern Ecuador allied with Waskar and managed to imprison Atawallpa. 
He later escaped and not only destroyed the southern Ecuadorian city of Tumipampa, but 
also the Chimor city of Tumbez (which had also allied with Waskar).137 Rostworowski 
de Díez Canseco argues that Waskar’s “continual blunders” eventually helped Atawallpa 
gain support for his campaign among the northern peoples of the empire.138 Amidst this 
complicated situation arrived Spanish explorers and conquerors led by Francisco Pizarro.  
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CHAPTER VII 
SPANISH CONQUEST 
 
The arrival of Spain to western South America at a time when the Inca Empire stood 
socially and politically broken proved fortuitous to the European conquerors and a 
nightmare to the Incas. Indeed, not only was the Inca Empire during this time struggling 
with a civil war, but the deadly smallpox epidemic was in full bloom. Moreover, when 
taking into consideration the decades of internal turmoil described in this research, the 
Incas were possibly in the most vulnerable moment of their history. 
Spanish explorations initially reached the northern regions of the Inca Empire in 1522, 
during the reign of Wayna Qhapaq. Francisco Pizarro, an adventurer and hidalgo (minor 
aristocrat) from the Extremadura province of Spain, afterwards led two unsuccessful 
expeditions to the Inca Empire in 1524 and 1527. Finally, after gaining approval for his 
third expedition directly from Spain, Pizarro gathered a force large enough to defeat an 
empire that had considerably weakened in the course of his three expeditions.139 In a 
surprising sequence of events, Pizarro defeated the Incas and conquered their domains. 
The following sections shall describe Pizarro’s conquest of the Inca Empire, with 
particular emphasis on the effect of his alliances with local Amerindians and the often 
ignored black conquerors and slaves who accompanied the white Spaniards. In order to 
evaluate this impact, the chapter first begins with an analysis of the early Spanish 
expeditions to the Inca Empire, including that of Spanish conqueror and explorer Pascual 
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de Andagoya. Ultimately, this chapter brings to a close the analysis over the impact of 
Pachakutiq’s regulations, and explains how local resistance transformed from 
insurrections against the Inca state into alliances with the Spanish conquerors. 
 
Early hardships 
Prior to his conquest of the Inca Empire, Francisco Pizarro carried out two unsuccessful 
expeditions into Inca territory. The first expedition had its roots in a prior journey led by 
Spanish explorer Pascual de Andagoya. The expedition of Andagoya started in 1522 as 
he traveled east of the Spanish Panama colony, located in Central America. He writes in 
his account of the expedition that, after capturing a fort in the area, local chiefs rendered 
their defeat and told him of the lands “as far as Cuzco.” Andagoya continued his 
explorations, but faced a near-death experience when he almost drowned after falling 
from a canoe. In an event that would repeat itself throughout the exploration and 
conquest of western South America, the Spanish conqueror was saved from death by his 
Amerindian ally (in this case the chief). Nevertheless, Andagoya fell ill after the event as 
a result of staying “for two hours wet through” in addition to facing “cold air.”140 
According to historian Curt Lamar, at this time is when “three men, informal partners, 
[...] Francisco Pizarro, Diego de Almagro, and the priest Hernando de Luque, acting on 
behalf of one Gaspar de Espinosa,” approached Andagoya with the intentions of buying 
his ships. Andagoya claims that Panama’s governor Pedro Arias de Avila encouraged 
him to let the three men lead the expedition claiming that “they would repay [him] what 
[he] had expended.”141 Thus began the role of Francisco Pizarro in the conquest of Peru. 
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Francisco Pizarro’s first expedition, lasting from 1524 to 1525, was a complete disaster. 
Lamar writes that the Spaniards “experienced numerous hardships,” these including 
those described by historian Shane Mountjoy as “strong winds, fierce storms, and rough 
seas.” Mountjoy further adds that Pizarro’s troops, made up of 114 volunteers, “suffered 
in oppressive heat” and that many died from “disease, fatigue, and starvation.” If that 
was not enough, Diego de Almagro lost an eye during one confrontation against the 
native inhabitants of present-day Colombia.142 Pascual de Andagoya excused himself 
from this expedition’s failure by claiming that Pizarro “took a different direction” from 
what he had recommended as a result of mistrust. Needless to say, Pizarro’s expedition 
returned to Panama, where Lamar notes that even Gaspar de Espinosa “withdrew his 
considerable financial support.”143 Despite the failure, Pizarro was not ready to give up. 
Francisco Pizarro’s second expedition, lasting from 1526 to 1528, still showed a lack of 
planning and organization albeit it turned out somewhat more successful than the first. 
For this expedition, Lamar notes that Pizarro “persuaded Almagro and Father Luque to 
join him on a formal partnership.”144 The expedition of 160 men made it south to the 
island of Gallo in Colombia. The climate of the island was the cause of the expedition’s 
initial failure, with several of the men dying or falling ill. At this time Pedro de los Rios, 
the new governor of Panama, sent a ship to find the men and order their return to 
Panama. Nonetheless, Andagoya claims that the governor took this action “moved by 
avarice.” The majority complied, but Pizarro and thirteen of his men continued the 
exploration. Their stubbornness paid off as they finally reached the Inca Empire, landing 
at the aforementioned city of Tumbez. Andagoya provides a valuable insight on the 
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response of the inhabitants, noting that “they did not fear them or desired to injure them, 
thinking that they were merchants.”145 According to Mountjoy, “Pizarro was satisfied 
that he had finally found the empire he hoped to conquer,” but upon his return to Panama 
to report his findings, “the governor was not impressed with his ‘cheap display of gold 
and silver toys and a few Indian sheep.’” Undeterred, Almagro and Luque agreed to send 
Pizarro directly to Spain in order to get financing from the king. Mountjoy claims that 
they did not trust Pizarro, but they had only enough money for a one-person trip.146 As 
such, disorganization, mistrust, and avarice continued to be a problem for the Spaniards. 
The trip back to his homeland was a complete success for Francisco Pizarro. In 1529, the 
Spanish Crown agreed to help finance the third expedition, providing Pizarro with land 
titles and powers over the lands of the Incas that favored him above his associates. For 
example, out of a maximum of 1500 ducats that Pizarro could collect from taxation, only 
500 went to Diego de Almagro. Afterwards, Pizarro went back to his native Extremadura 
in order to recruit people for his expedition, including several of his family members.147 
However, these were not the only preparations taken for the third expedition. 
 
Black slaves and conquerors 
Indeed, Francisco Pizarro not only gained the Spanish Crown’s approval to conquer the 
Inca Empire, but he also was allowed to take with him black slaves. The important 
aspect of this permission to take slaves is that it came directly from the Spanish Crown, 
but even in previous expeditions black slaves had taken an important role in helping the 
white Spaniards. Historian Frederick Bowser argues that “blacks figured in all 
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expeditions undertaken by the company between 1524 and 1528.” Furthermore, he 
mentions that at one point a black slave helped save Diego de Almagro’s life.148 So, even 
though the early sections of this research did not explicitly mention the racial 
composition of the Spanish conquerors, it should be understood that there were indeed 
blacks participating in the early expeditions of Francisco Pizarro. 
The participation of black conquerors continued well into the main stages of the Spanish 
conquest of the Inca Empire. In his book Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest, 
ethnohistorian Matthew Restall claims that “Spaniards expected to have several native or 
black auxiliaries,” and “they considered it a great hardship to go without them.” In fact, 
Restall states that during the Battle of Cajamarca, where Atawallpa was captured by 
Spanish forces, the only casualty from the Spanish side was a black slave.149 Yet, the 
participation of black conquerors in Spanish expeditions throughout the Americas (not 
just western South America) is still relatively unknown. Restall argues that the reason for 
this situation is "because the majority of such Africans arrived as slaves, and because of 
their subordinate status in the increasingly ethnocentric Castilian worldview, the 
widspread and central role of blacks was consistently ignored by Spaniards writing about 
the Conquest.”150 As such, although the remaining sections of this research will no 
longer make mention of the black conquerors, it is not because they are unimportant or 
nonexistent, but rather because much more is yet to be researched on this topic. 
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Spanish-Amerindian alliances 
The focus of this research has so far been on the interactions between the Incas and their 
conquered Amerindian societies, but these societies also played a prominent role during 
the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire. The Spaniards were well-aware of the 
conflicting relations between the peoples of the Inca Empire and their rulers. For 
example, Hernando Pizarro, conquistador and brother of Francisco Pizarro, relates how 
he offered the Inca emperor Atawallpa his aid in subduing insurrections within the 
empire.151 This account demonstrates that the Spaniards knew of the social problems of 
the empire, but the offer to aid Atawallpa changed after they captured him in Cajamarca. 
Spanish conqueror Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa writes that “Don Francisco Pizarro 
knew of the disputes there had been between Atahualpa and Huascar,” and he requested 
that Waskar (who had previously been captured by Atawallpa) be brought to him. 
Atawallpa, fearing that Pizarro would ally with Waskar, ordered the execution of his 
brother. Sarmiento writes that Pizarro, based on this and “for other good and sufficient 
causes,” ordered the death of Atawallpa.152 The Spanish intervention on the Inca Civil 
War thus served to further agitate an already chaotic situation in western South America. 
Chaos was to the advantage of the Spaniards who soon enough received the aid of 
several Amerindian societies who had opposed Atawallpa. Historian Kenneth Andrien 
contends that “the defeated allies of Huascar, particularly the Cañari, the Chachapoyas, 
and the Huancas proved only too willing to side with the Spaniards against their Inca 
overlords.”153 The Huancas proved particularly important to the Spaniards. According to 
historian Karen Spalding, “the Huancas provided Pizarro with warriors, provisions, and 
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services of all kinds.” Spalding further mentions that “over 3,000 Huanca warriors” 
accompanied the Spanish conquerors on their way to Cuzco. Nevertheless, the Inca army 
still proved dangerous. In two occasions “the Spaniards narrowly escaped defeat.”154 
Hence, with the aid of the Amerindians, Pizarro marched victoriously on to Cuzco. 
 
Resurgence and aftermath 
After nearly a century of rule, in 1533 the Inca Empire ceased to exist. However, the fall 
of the Inca government did not mean the immediate end of the Incas. Upon achieving the 
conquest of the Inca state, Francisco Pizarro did not simply destroy the Inca structure. In 
fact, he tried to return stability by appointing as new emperor Tupac Huallpa, a younger 
brother of Waskar. Of course, this new ruler was in reality nothing more than a puppet of 
the Spaniards. Thoroughly compliant, Tupac Huallpa died before actually accomplishing 
anything in favor of the Spaniards.155 Pizarro subsequently chose a new emperor. 
The next puppet emperor placed by Francisco Pizarro, Manqu Inka Yupanki, proved to 
be the last bulwark of the Incas. Archaeologist Gordon McEwan argues that Manqu 
initially “was eager to avenge the defeat of Huascar by cooperating with the Spaniards.” 
However, the new conquerors constantly belittled him, and so he decided to lead a major 
uprising against the Spaniards in 1536.156 Manqu organized a number of loyal troops to 
lay siege to Cuzco and Lima, but the Amerindian allies of the Spaniards once again came 
to their rescue. According to historian Rafael Varon Gabai, this aid provided by the allies 
of the conquerors helped “secure Spanish control of Peru.”157 Manqu Inka’s losses in 
Lima and Cuzco placed the last nail on the coffin that forever entombed the Inca state. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Inca Empire developed in the Andes Mountains of western South America during a 
period of interstate warfare caused by unstable climatic conditions and the political void 
left by the fall of the Wari and Tiwanaku empires. Cuzco, the place from where the Incas 
originated, was a valuable agricultural area which had the benefit of receiving both Wari 
and Tiwanaku technological and cultural influence while both empires blossomed. The 
Incas emerged with the mindset of recreating the glory of these past empires. When the 
ambitious Inca nobility found its match in the resourceful and determined Pachakutiq, a 
young Inca prince, they embarked their civilization in a course of successful conquests. 
Overtime, as the Incas increased the size of their domains, Pachakutiq realized that his 
empire would be doomed unless he somehow unified the diverse cultures and societies 
of the Andes. In order to achieve his goal, Pachakutiq implemented a variety of methods 
to control and standardize the population. These regulations included the implementation 
of a planned economy where everyone knew their role in society, increasing government 
control over the everyday lives of all individuals, and the institutionalization of social 
inequality where all societies were subservient to the Incan central administration.  
Nonetheless, these plans never achieved their desired outcomes. Traditional Andean 
ideology did not accept the increasingly oppressive regulations imposed by the Incas. 
Regardless of the Inca’s harsh punishment against rebels, which at times included the 
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total annihilation of societies, the peoples of the Inca Empire took any opportunity to rise 
against the Inca state. As such, the impressive changes that Pachakutiq implemented 
within his empire never gave fruit during his lifetime, and subsequent Inca emperors 
simply made the situation worse. Tupaq Inka Yupanki, Pachakutiq’s son, kept expanding 
the empire without placing much consideration on its administrative control. Wayna 
Qhapaq, Pachakutiq’s grandson, focused his reign on trying to consolidate the power of 
the imperial government on his own person and at the expense of the Inca nobility. Upon 
his unexpected death, a weakened Inca power structure fell into chaos as competing 
factions, formed around princes Waskar and Atawallpa, fought each other for power. 
Disunity within the Inca Empire, which at the time was also struggling with a smallpox 
epidemic, gave Spanish conqueror Francisco Pizarro and his troops the ability to break 
the empire from within its borders. Although the Spaniards faced initial hardships, their 
acquisition of large numbers of black slaves and Amerindian allies provided them the 
power to topple the Inca government. These black conquerors and Amerindians, the 
unsung heroes of the Spanish conquest, proved invaluable to Pizarro’s success. 
However, even after the fall of their government, the Incas continued their fight against 
the Spaniards. Led by Manqu Inka Yupanki, the Incas took advantage of disputes among 
the Spaniards in order to regain their empire. Yet, the Amerindians whom the Incas had 
so arduously oppressed rescued the Spaniards and gave the final blow to the faltering 
Inca resistance. So it was that after nearly a century of power, internal disunity, along 
with a smallpox epidemic and a devastating civil war, ended the Inca Empire. 
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